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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys- tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …the following day, whithi next U-2 mission returned from the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 (18 Marcn n, CJJA rerar9 ITS Codeword). OSA History. chap. 4…
  • p. 142 …of the first series of U-2 missions as condu this research under a project codenamed…
  • p. 147 …not an easy task in crowded Japan.`) Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after…
  • p. 191 …This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent with it, was sent to…
  • p. 196 …with Abel's "wife" (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI…
  • p. 204 …in-the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais- sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
Chapter 1
5
Richard S. Leghorn
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
In Leghorn's view, altitude was the key to success for overhead
reconnaissance. Since the best Soviet interceptor at that time, the
MIG-17, had to struggle to reach 45,000 feet, 6 Leghorn reasoned that
an aircraft that could exceed 60,000 feet would be safe from Soviet
fighters. Recognizing that the fastest way to produce a high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft was to modify an existing aircraft, he began
looking for the highest flying aircraft available in the Free World.
This search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomber—
the Canberra—built by the English Electric Company. The Canberra
had made its first flight in May 1949. Its speed of 469 knots (870 ki-
lometers per hour) and its service ceiling of 48,000 feet made the
Canberra a natural choice for high-altitude reconnaissance work. The
Royal Air Force quickly developed a reconnaissance version of the
Canberra, the PR3 (the PR stood for photoreconnaissance), which be-
gan flying in March (950.7
At Leghorn's insistence, the Wright Air Development
Command invited English Electric representatives to Dayton in the
summer of 1951 to help find ways to make the Canberra fly even
higher. By this time the Air Force had already adopted the bomber
ve-rsion of the Canberra, which the Glenn L. Martin Aircraft
Company was to produce under license as the B-57 medium bomb-
er. Leghorn and his English Electric colleagues designed a new
Canberra configuration with very long high-lift wings, new
Rolls-Royce Avon-I09 engines, a solitary pilot, and an airframe that
was stressed to less than the standard military specifications.
Leghorn calculated that a Canberra so equipped might reach 63,000
feet early in a long mission and as high as 67,000 feet as the declin-
ing fuel supply lightened the aircraft. He believed that such a modi-
fied Canberra could penetrate the Soviet Union and China for a
radius of 800 miles from bases around their periphery and photo-
graph up to 85 percent of the intelligence targets in those countries.
Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the .
Pentagon for funding. He had not, however, cleared his idea with the
Air Research and Development Command, whose reconnaissance
13.716 meters. To avoid giving a false impression of extremely precise measurements,
original English measuring system figures in round numbers have not been converted to
the metric system. To convert feet to meters, multiply by 0.3048. To convert airspeeds in
knots (nautical miles per hour) to kilometers per hour. multiply by 1.85.
Dick van der Aart, Aerial Espionage, Secret Intelligence Flights by East and West
(Shrewsbury. England: Airlife Publishing, 1985). p. 18.
ret
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.