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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
SZ.le "NQE,CZN
Chapter 4
161
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
As concern about Soviet missile progress increased, even the in-
terruption in Soviet ICBM testing was seen as evidence of a Soviet
advantage. Although the CIA correctly reasoned that the Soviets were
experiencing difficulties in developing an operational ICBM, the Air
Force assumed that the Soviets had halted testing because the missile
was ready for deployment.4
The controversy intensified early in February 1959, when
Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy testified before the Senate
Preparedness Investigating Committee on Soviet missile capabilities
for the next few years. McElroy told the Senators that in the early
1960s the Soviet Union might have a 3 to 1 advantage over the United
States in operational ICBMs. McElroy stressed that the gap would be
temporary and that at its end the United States would enjoy a techno-
logical advantage because it was concentrating on developing the
more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num-
ber of obsolescent liquid-fueled missiles, but it was his mention of a 3
to 1 missile gap that made the headlines. Administration critics such
as Senator Stuart Symington quickly charged that the actual gap
would eventually be even larger.'
Faced with rising public and Congressional concern about the
missile gap, Defense Department officials pressed President
Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in-
formation about the status of the Soviet missile program. Following a
National Security Council meeting on 12 February, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Twining, Secretary of Defense McElroy, and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles stayed behind to talk to the
President about overflights. They hoped that the need to refute criti-
cism of the missile gap from Symington and other Democratic
Senators would persuade the President to loosen his policy on the use
of the U-2. McElroy pointed out that no matter how often Allen
Dulles briefed these critics, they would not believe his reassurances
about the absence of a missile gap without positive proof such as pho-
tographs. More overflights would be needed to obtain the kinds of
photographs required.
The President was not swayed by these arguments. Noting that
the reconnaissance satellite project was "coming along nicely," he
stated that U-2 flights should be "held to a minimum pending the
Freedman, US Intelligence. p. 70.
"What About the Missile Gap'?" nine, 9 February 1959, pp. 11-13.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.