“Lockheed”60+ pages
- p. 4 …Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft 8
Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA 13
Scientists…
- p. 6 …260
Competition Between Lockheed and Convair 267
The Selection of the Lockheed Design 270
Efforts To…
- p. 12 …excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2
(1983).
E0129581.131d111>10<25Yrs…
- p. 21 …August 1953, OS1 records (S).
" Jay Miller, Lockheed U-2, Aerograph 3 (Austin, Texas: Aerofax, 1983…
- p. 22 …Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to
Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the…
- p. 23 …high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft
Chapter 1
10
Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the…
- p. 24 …Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 12. For more details on Kelly Johnson's original proposal.
see…
- p. 25 12
The Lockheed CL-282
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 1
Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay…
- p. 26 …Despite the Air Force's selection
of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the…
- p. 27 …six days before the Wright Air Development Command
began to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described…
- p. 28 …range are not as good as the
Lockheed CL-282.
Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL…
- p. 29 …Few details about Dulles's precise attitude
toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available,
but…
- p. 30 …At this point, the summer of 1954, Lockheed's CL-282 proposal
still lacked official support…
- p. 37 …ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel to
southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design…
- p. 39 …Thus, even though
the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by
September 1954…
- p. 40 …Council.46
Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282
Even before the final Technological Capabilities…
- p. 42 …Agency.49
Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft
soon after he…
- p. 43 …Chapter 1
30
briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the
24…
- p. 44 …During September and October the Project Three study group
met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design…
- p. 47 …The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the
reach of…
- p. 48 …Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar-
gued that the Bell…
- p. 49 …He used Gardner's
statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the
project, which…
- p. 50 …small group of prominent scientists that the
Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais-
sance…
- p. 52 …afternoon of 3 December, they
Although the Lockheed CL-282 was not designated as the U…
- p. 53 …Eventually Bissell asked who was
going to pay for the airframes to be built by Lockheed…
- p. 55 …This category in-
cluded maintenance personnel from Lockheed (five per
aircraft), the pilots, and support personnel…
- p. 57 …Then on 22 December 1954, the Agency
signed a letter contract with Lockheed, using the codename…
- p. 58 …The U-2 would have a
The Lockheed "Skunk Works" was named after the Kickapoo Joy…
- p. 59 …Johnson, -A High-Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft, - 9 December 1954,
Lockheed Contract Files, OSA Records (S).
UNCLASSIFIED
- p. 61 …Reconnaissance Aircraft, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Report 10420. 28 January 1955.
pp. 7-9, OSA Recordsi \ (5…
- p. 63 …1954, even before the CIA adopted
the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he
would…
- p. 69 …Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20.
Sè'biet
UNCLASSIFIED
- p. 74 …aircraft—remained the ex-
clusive province of Lockheed:9
As a result of this agreement, CIA…
- p. 77 …The first model of the
pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for…
- p. 79 …Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed
CL-282 was going to be known officially as the…
- p. 81 …former director of Lockheed's Skunk Works,
to Donald E. Welzenbach, 14 March 1986 (U): Miller…
- p. 84 …7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22.
OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 12-14…
- p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees
from Burbank to Iwithout arousing a great deal of curiosity.
The…
- p. 88 …Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAL pilots who were to be
trained by Lockheed…
- p. 90 …CIA, which then placed an order with
Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be…
- p. 107 …U-2
cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown
by the USAF…
- p. 143 …Lockheed mechanics
had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a
Lockheed test…
- p. 144 …Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed test pilot
Robert Sicker bailed out but was struck…
- p. 145 …The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots, as well as the pro-
totype…
- p. 157 …As a substitute,
Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant
qualities, but this…
- p. 162 …a series of tests over Edwards AFB. Lockheed began coating
the 11-2s with a standard…
- p. 188 …Although it haL refurbished by
Lockheed and now had the more powerful 175 engine that would…
- p. 200 …Beschloss claims that Powers was fired by Lockheed
for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which…
- p. 209 …Some poetic justice in this.'
One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to up…
- p. 211 …In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that
they could be refueled in…
- p. 220 …story, which
was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to
Puerto Rico…
- p. 230 …CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 5
Late in 1958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining
U…
- p. 264 …1966 decided to place an order with Lockheed for ei g ht more aircraft
to be…
- p. 265 …Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who
checked out this new aircraft…
- p. 266 …began coming off the production line at Lockheed
in-the autumn of 1968, CIA and the…
- p. 273 …SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program,"
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. 1 July 1968, p…
- p. 275 …Personnel at Lockheed's Skunk Works referred to
these aircraft concepts as "Archangel-1," "Archangel-2…
- p. 276 RN
Chapter 6
263
Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Lockheed design for a hydrogen…
- p. 280 …During the first half of 1959, both Lockheed and Convair
worked to reduce the radar cross…
- p. 281 …In early June, Lockheed submitted a design for a ground-launched
aircraft known as the A…
SZ.le "NQE,CZN
Chapter 4
161
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
As concern about Soviet missile progress increased, even the in-
terruption in Soviet ICBM testing was seen as evidence of a Soviet
advantage. Although the CIA correctly reasoned that the Soviets were
experiencing difficulties in developing an operational ICBM, the Air
Force assumed that the Soviets had halted testing because the missile
was ready for deployment.4
The controversy intensified early in February 1959, when
Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy testified before the Senate
Preparedness Investigating Committee on Soviet missile capabilities
for the next few years. McElroy told the Senators that in the early
1960s the Soviet Union might have a 3 to 1 advantage over the United
States in operational ICBMs. McElroy stressed that the gap would be
temporary and that at its end the United States would enjoy a techno-
logical advantage because it was concentrating on developing the
more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num-
ber of obsolescent liquid-fueled missiles, but it was his mention of a 3
to 1 missile gap that made the headlines. Administration critics such
as Senator Stuart Symington quickly charged that the actual gap
would eventually be even larger.'
Faced with rising public and Congressional concern about the
missile gap, Defense Department officials pressed President
Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in-
formation about the status of the Soviet missile program. Following a
National Security Council meeting on 12 February, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Twining, Secretary of Defense McElroy, and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles stayed behind to talk to the
President about overflights. They hoped that the need to refute criti-
cism of the missile gap from Symington and other Democratic
Senators would persuade the President to loosen his policy on the use
of the U-2. McElroy pointed out that no matter how often Allen
Dulles briefed these critics, they would not believe his reassurances
about the absence of a missile gap without positive proof such as pho-
tographs. More overflights would be needed to obtain the kinds of
photographs required.
The President was not swayed by these arguments. Noting that
the reconnaissance satellite project was "coming along nicely," he
stated that U-2 flights should be "held to a minimum pending the
Freedman, US Intelligence. p. 70.
"What About the Missile Gap'?" nine, 9 February 1959, pp. 11-13.
UNCLASSIFIED