CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

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Chapter 3
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speed, apply full throttle to the engine, then pull back on the stick and
zoom as high as he could. In this manner the Soviet pilot hoped to
come up directly beneath the U-2 so he could use his guns and mis-
siles against the shiny U-2 etched in silver against the dark blue-black
of space. Using this maneuver, some MiGs were able to climb as high
as the U-2 but seldom got very close. At this height the MiGs were
completely out of control; their small, swept-back wings provided in-
sufficient lift; and their control surfaces were too small to maintain
aircraft stability. U-2 pilots often spotted MiGs that reached the apex
of their zoom climbs and then fell away toward the earth. The US pi-
lots' greatest fear was that one of the MiGs would actually collide
with a U-2 during a zoom climb.I°4
U-2 pilots complained that they felt like ducks in a shooting gal-
lery under these circumstances and suggested that the underside of the
silvery aircraft be camouflaged in some manner. Kelly Johnson had
originally believed the U-2 would Hy so high that it would be invisi-
ble, thus eliminating the need to paint the aircraft and thereby avoid-
ing the added weight and drag that paint produced. The paint penalty
was calculated to be a foot of altitude for every pound of paint. A full
coat of paint cost the U-2 250 feet of altitude, substantially less than
the 1,500-foot penalty paid for the addition of dirty bird devices.
By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done.
After a series of tests over Edwards AFB. Lockheed began coating
the 11-2s with a standard blue-black military specificatioi oa . nt on to
and a lighter cloud-blue paint below. Subsequent tests
revealed that the U-2s were less conspicuous when painted all over
with a matte-finish blue-black color, which helped them blend with
the dark canopy of space.'*
MORE POWERFUL ENGINES FOR THE U-2
Less conspicuous paints were not the only answer to the growing
threat of Soviet interceptors. A more powerful engine would increase
the U-2's maximum altitude, which was the surest way to protect the
aircraft from all Soviet threats. During late 1958 and early 1959.
Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U-2s-
originally the Agency had taken delivery of 20 planes and the Air
Information supplied by to Donald E.
Welzenbach, May 1986.
Lockheed contracts, OSA records (S).
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UNCLASSIFIED