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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
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134
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The Agency
then turned to the Navy, which granted permission for Detachment C
to use the Naval Air Station at Atsugi, Japan. The Japanese
Government received no notification of the proposed deployment be-
cause at that time it had no control over activities involving US mili-
tary bases in Japan. Deployment of Detachment C began in early
1957 but was complicated by a recent decision to permit the families
of Project AQUATONE employees to accompany them on overseas
tours. As a result, program managers had to find housing facilities on
the base or in nearby communities. not an easy task in crowded
Japan.`)
Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after
several aircraft and pilots flew to Eielson Air Force Base near
Fairbanks, Alaska. Air Force radar order-of-battle reports and NSA
studies had revealed that the radar network in the Soviet Far East,
with antiquated radar sets and personnel of a lower caliber than those
in the western Soviet Union, was relatively ineffective. To take ad-
vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions
from Alaska into the Soviet Far East. The first. on 7/8 June (the air-
craft crossed the international date line during the flight), was unable
to photograph its target, the ICBM impact area near Klyuchi on the
Kamchatka Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never
entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph Klyuchi on
19/20 June was marred by a camera malfunction that ruined every
third frame of photography. This flight was tracked by Soviet radars,
but there was no attempt at interception. After a pause of almost three
months during which Detachment C received a dirty-bird U-2, the de-
tachment's third mission over Klyuchi on 15/16 September 1957
achieved excellent results. The radar-deception devices proved inef-
fective, however, as the U-2 was tracked by Soviet radar and trailed
by five fighters.'"
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OS.- History. chap. 15. pp. 2. 16-19; chap. 16. p. I ITS Codeword).
" Mission folders 6002 (8 June 1957), 6005 (20 June 1957). and 6008 (16 September
1957). OSA records TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.