Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
“Hill”13 pages
--swerermerettpd Chapter 3 128 E0129581.61M11>1010<25Yrs ES1 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED remaining opposed to flights over most of the Soviet Union, Eisenhower finally agreed to permit some flights over peripheral areas such as Kamchatka Peninsula and Lake Baikal, as well as the Soviet Union's atomic testing area at Semipalatinsk. Such overflights could be staged frorrl The President rejected the Air Force's request to take over tne U-2 program, stating that he preferred to have the aircraft manned by civilians "during operations of this kind." 'I The President had once again agreed to allow overflights of the Soviet Union, although only over certain areas, because the need to learn more about the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union was too compelling. In particular, the President and top administra- tion officials wanted to gather more data on the Soviet Union's mis- sile program, a subject for which considerable Soviet boasting—but no hard data—was available. Even after he had authorized the resumption of overflights, President Eisenhower maintained tight control over the program. He personally authorized each overflight, which meant that Richard Bissell would bring maps to the White House with the proposed routes marked on them for the President to examine. More than once, accord- ing to Bissell, Eisenhower spread the map out on his Oval Office desk for detailed study, usually with his son John (an Army officer serving as a White House aide) and Colonel Goodpaster looking over his shoulder. On occasion, the President would pick up a pencil and elimi- nate a flight leg or make some other correction to the flight plan.7' RADAR-DECEPTIVE "DIRTY BIRDS" One additional reason why President Eisenhower had again autho- rized overflights of the Soviet Union was renewed CIA promises that Soviet detection or tracking of the U-2 was unlikely. At the 6 May 1957 meeting with the President. Richard Bissell reported on the progress that had been made in developing radar camouflage and Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference with the President. 6 May 1957 (TS): "Record of Action—Meeting of May 6, 1957. - WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS). Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S); Beschloss. Mayday, p. 140. UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.