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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design."' Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar. California. 20 May 1985 (S). Johnson, "Log for…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson's revolutionary design a reality, one additional source of support was necessary…
  • p. 42 …When James Killian asked Land to head Project Three, Land had to make a major decision…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, 1 overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …a week after he had been authorized to begin the project, Kelly Johnson wrote a 23…
  • p. 69 …project staff) flew LIZ with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by eed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Batlin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermann Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a "wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 RN Chapter 6 263 Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Lockheed design for a hydrogen…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
--swerermerettpd
Chapter 3
128
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005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
remaining opposed to flights over most of the Soviet Union,
Eisenhower finally agreed to permit some flights over peripheral
areas such as Kamchatka Peninsula and Lake Baikal, as well as the
Soviet Union's atomic testing area at Semipalatinsk. Such overflights
could be staged frorrl
The President rejected the Air Force's request to take over tne
U-2 program, stating that he preferred to have the aircraft manned by
civilians "during operations of this kind." 'I
The President had once again agreed to allow overflights of the
Soviet Union, although only over certain areas, because the need to
learn more about the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union
was too compelling. In particular, the President and top administra-
tion officials wanted to gather more data on the Soviet Union's mis-
sile program, a subject for which considerable Soviet boasting—but
no hard data—was available.
Even after he had authorized the resumption of overflights,
President Eisenhower maintained tight control over the program. He
personally authorized each overflight, which meant that Richard
Bissell would bring maps to the White House with the proposed routes
marked on them for the President to examine. More than once, accord-
ing to Bissell, Eisenhower spread the map out on his Oval Office desk
for detailed study, usually with his son John (an Army officer serving
as a White House aide) and Colonel Goodpaster looking over his
shoulder. On occasion, the President would pick up a pencil and elimi-
nate a flight leg or make some other correction to the flight plan.7'
RADAR-DECEPTIVE "DIRTY BIRDS"
One additional reason why President Eisenhower had again autho-
rized overflights of the Soviet Union was renewed CIA promises that
Soviet detection or tracking of the U-2 was unlikely. At the 6 May
1957 meeting with the President. Richard Bissell reported on the
progress that had been made in developing radar camouflage and
Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference with the President. 6 May 1957
(TS): "Record of Action—Meeting of May 6, 1957. - WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).
Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S); Beschloss. Mayday, p. 140.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.