Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
“Hill”13 pages
Chapter 3 115 SJbet CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED The Suez Crisis was a major turning point in the use of the U-2 airplane. Before this crisis, the U-2 had been seen solely as a collector of strategic intelligence, with high-quality results considered more important than speed. U-2 film had, therefore, been returned to the manufacturer for optimum development and then interpreted in Washington using the most up-to-date devices. Now, because of the Middle East crisis, Project AQUATONE was expected to perform like a tactical reconnaissance unit, developing film immediately after landing for instant interpretation or "readout." Photo-Intelligence Division personnel assigned to Project HTAUTOMAT (U-2 film ex- ploitation), therefore, had to arrange for forward processing of the U-2 film to avoid unacceptable delays in providing intelligence on tactical developments around Suez. PID acted quickly to carry out its new assignment. Lundahl and Reber flew from the United Kingdom to US Air Force Europe head- quarters in Wiesbaden on 12 September, 'They hadto make arrangements for processing and interpreting U-2 film in' been preceded by chief of PID's Special Projects Branch. Following detailed discussions with Air Force photo- intelligence personnel, the CIA representatives arranged to use a por- tion of a nearby Air Force photo laboratory for developing U-2 film. With the assistance of chief of the HTAUTOMAT photo laboratory, and Air rorce perNuhnel, had the lab ready for processing on the following day, whithi next U-2 mission returned from the Middle East. After quickly developing the film, and his joint staff of CIA and armed forces personnel stud- ied it tor indications of British and French preparations for hostilities and sent their first report to Washington on 15 September. Althou gh the Air Force provided considerable assistance in es- tablishing photo laboratory, Air Force officials did not like the idea of A personnel controlling overseas photo processing and interpretation centers, which were normally under Air Force con- trol. Further negotiations led to a CIA—Air Force agreement at the end of October, under which the Air Force would name the commanding officer for such installations and the CIA would designate the deputy, who was responsible for technical and intelligence matters.47 ND soon added two photointerpreters and a lab technician to the 'operation, which continued to develop and interpret U-2 photography of the Middle East throughout September and Ibid., pp. 49-52 (S). E0129581.6011111>10101010<25Yrs UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.