Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
“Kapustin Yar”6 pages
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED S"ZatiThIQE,C),B4.1 Chapter 3 112 No one in the White House, the CIA, or the Air Force could reveal that U-2 photographs had actually provided the primary evidence for this change in the estimates.' The need to keep the existence of the U-2 program secret caused problems even within the CIA itself. The Office of Security sharply restricted the number of persons who could be cleared for access to U-2 photography. The special clearance was granted on a "slot" ba- sis, and only the person assigned to a particular position or "slot" could have the clearance. The U-2 photographs were kept in a secure room, and only those with special clearances were admitted to the room. In addition, the Office of Security considered U-2 information too sensitive to use in CIA publications. As a result, many analysts did not have access to information that would have greatly aided the production of intelligence estimates.42 TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS Although U-2s had ceased flying over the Soviet Bloc because of President Eisenhower's standdown order, they could still be used elsewhere in the world. The Middle East would be the next area for U-2 operations. On 26 July 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in retaliation for the de- cision by the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw fi- nancial support for the Aswan Dam project. Nasser's action provoked an international crisis that would have a permanent effect on the U-2 program. Long before the Suez Crisis developed, the CIA had planned to deploy U-2s in Turkey for use in the Soviet overflight program. On I May 1956, US Charge d'Affaires Foy D. Kohler approached Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on this matter. He told the Prime Minister that the effort was a continuation of the GENETR1X pro- gram, during which balloons had been released from Turkey, and in- volved aircraft that could fly 10,000 feet higher than any Soviet plane. Menderes gave his approval immediately. At the time of the John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial Press, 1982), pp. 45-47. Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). UNCLASSIFIED
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.