Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
“Hill”13 pages
project known as to establish a CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED ""ZetirNOC-013,14. Chapter 3 110 (0129581.61d111J>10<25Yrs IS1 the United States delivered an oral protest concerning overflights of Poland on 20 June and 2 July. This was followed by a protest note from the Czechoslovak Government on 21 July. No formal reply was sent to the two Soviet satellite states.37 The details of the fiightpaths listed in the Soviet and Polish pro- tests, along with the subsequent photographic evidence of Soviet in- terception attempts, made it clear that U-2s could not fly undetected over the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe and could even be tracked for extended periods of time. This news greatly disturbed President Eisenhower. In a meeting with Allen Dulles on 19 July 1956, the President recalled how he had been told that "not over a very minor percentage of these (flights) would be picked up." He went on to question "how far this should now be pushed, knowing that detection is not likely to be avoided." After discussing the possibility of basing U-2s in the Far East, President Eisenhower went on to say that he had "lost enthusiasm" for the U-2 activity. He noted that, if the United States were on the receiving end of a Soviet overflight operation, "the reaction would be drastic." The President was also concerned that the American public might learn of the overflights and be shocked that their country had violated international law. He stated, "Soviet pro- tests were one thing, any loss of confidence by our own people would be quite another." m The President's rapid disenchantment with the project was not lost on Richard Bissell. Fearing for the U-2 program's survival, he met with the Land committee in early August 1956 to urge them to help make the U-2 less vulnerable to radar pulses. His goal was to reduce the aircraft's radar cross section so that it would be less sus- ceptible to detection. Edward Purcell had some ideas on this and sug- gested that he supervise a new project in the Boston area to explore them. At the direction of the Land committee, Bissell set in motion a eral MIT scholars who conducted studies and experiments into " "Alleged Violations of Soviet Territory: Soviet Note of July 10, 1956 with U.S. Reply." US Department of State Bulletin. 30 July 1956. pp. 191-192; OSA History, chap. 11, pp. 32-33 (TS Codeword). Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 19 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS). UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.