Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
“Hill”13 pages
--13ec,r4L 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED --Strere Chapter 3 106 Dulles that if we obtain any information or warning that any of the flights has been discovered or tracked, the operation should be sus- pended." Goodpaster called both Dulles and Bissell and was told that reports on tracking or attempted interception of the U-2s would not be available for another 36 hours. Later that day the two CIA officials met with Goodpaster to ask if flights could continue in the meantime. Goodpaster replied that his understanding of the President's directive was that the operation should continue -at the maximum rate until the first evidence of tracking was received." Although President Eisenhower had originally spoken of sus- pending the overflights if they were -discovered or tracked," his main concern was to learn if the Soviets could track U-2 missions, meaning that they could follow the flight on their radar screens for most or all of the missions and thus have numerous opportunities to attempt interception. Certainly the President hoped that U-2 flights could not even be detected, but reports received on the 20 June over- flight of Eastern Europe had already indicated that this goal was unre- alistic. The President's emphasis therefore shifted to tracking. If the Soviets could successfully track U-2 missions, he wanted the over- flights halted!) Reports on Soviet radar coverage of the first two overflights of the Soviet Union became available on 6 July. These re- ports showed that, although the Soviets did detect the aircraft and made several very unsuccessful attempts at interception, they could not track U-2s consistently. Interestingly, the Soviet radar coverage was weakest around the most important targets, Moscow and Leningrad, and the Soviets did not realize that U-2s had overflown these two cities." Detachment A carried out three more overflights of the Soviet Union during the 10-day period authorized by the President. Two of the missions (2020 and 2021) took place on a single day, 9 July 1956. They covered much of Eastern Europe, and the Ukraine and Belorussia in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, a broken camera EO 129581.6(0111>10<25Yrs IS) • Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 5 July 1956. WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS). Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster. interview by Donald E. Welzenbaeh and Gregory W. Pedlow, Washington, DC, 8 July 1987 (S). sn' Mission folders 2013 (4 July 1956) and 2014 (5 July 1956). OSA record• TS Codeword). UNCLASSIFIED
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.