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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
riTNQ.EQ N
Chapter 3
105
the Soviet Union's submarine construction program. Mission 2013's
route also overflew a number of major military airfields to make an
inventory of the new Bison jet-engine heavy bomber.2'
The second overflight, on the following day, continued the
search for Bison bombers. Pilot route was similar but
somewhat to the south of n a so ew farther east, more
than 200 kilometers past oscow. t ough the Soviet capital was al-
most completely hidden by clouds, the A-2 camera with haze filters
took some usable photographs of the city. These turned out to be the
only U-2 photographs of Moscow because no other mission was sent
over the Soviet capital. Among the key targets photographed during
mission 2014 were the Fili airframe plant, where the Bison was being
built; the bomber arsenal at Ramenskoye, where the Bisons were test-
ed; the Kaliningrad missile plant; and the Khimki rocket-engine
plant:6
When Allen Dulles returned to work on Thursday, 5 July 1956,
he asked Bissell if any overflights had taken place during the
Independence Day holiday. One had been made on the fourth and an-
other just that morning, Bissell replied. (Because of the six-hour time
difference, the 5 July flight was safely back in Wiesbaden by the
time Dulles spoke to Bissell.) When Dulles asked the routes of these
missions, Bissell told him that they had overflown both Moscow and
Leningrad. "Oh my Lord," Dulles exclaimed, "do you think that
was wise the first time?" "Allen," Bissell replied, "the first is the
safest." 27
President Eisenhower also wanted to know the results of the 4
and 5 July flights, but his principal concern was whether there had
been any indication that either flight had been discovered or tracked
by radar. Eisenhower told Colonel Goodpaster "to advise Mr. Allen
alVational Photographic Interpretation Center: The Years of Project
IYJ -1958. Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series
NPIC-3. December 1974, 6 vols. (hereafter cited as NPIC History). vol. 1, p. 20 (S);
Mission folder 2013 (4 July 1956), OSA records,' TTS Codeword).
Note on mission numbers: each proposed mission receivea a nurnuer. uui not all of these
missions were flown.
EO 129581.13(011>101010<25Yrs
Is)
NP1C History. vol. I. p. 21(5): Mission folder 2014 (5 July 1956), OSA records,
TS Codeword).
Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.