Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
“Burbank”8 pages
Chapter 3 101 Both of these restrictions on overflights of the Soviet Union were cleared up by the end of June. \ 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED Following the success of this first mission, Bissell was eager to begin overflights of the Soviet Union. But even after the President granted his approval on 21 June, such missions could not yet take place for two reasons. First, President Eisenhower had agreed with a CIA and State Department recommendation that West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in Germany (in keeping with ex- isting policies Adenauer was not informed about overflights of Eastern Europe). Second, Soviet party chief Nikita Khrushchev had invited representatives of the US Air Force to the Moscow Air Show, which opened on 23 June 1956. Led by Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan F. Twining, the delegation would be in the Soviet Union for a week, and General Twining requested that no overflights of the Soviet Union be staged until the Air Force delegation had left.'" A few days later the Air Force delegation returned from Moscow, but now unfavorable weather prevented the start of opera- tions against the Soviet Union. While waiting for the clouds over the Soviet Union to clear, Detachment A carried out two more overflights of Eastern Europe on 2 July 1956: mission 2009 over Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria; and mission 2010 over East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Romania. That afternoon Bissell and DDCI Cabell gave President Eisenhower a detailed briefing on the first U-2 overflight, which the President found "very interesting, very positive." Eisenhower was anxious to know, however, whether radars had tracked the aircraft. Bissell replied that, although East European radars had picked Up the 20 June flight, radar operators had misread the altitude as only 42,000 feet. He added that the Agency was awaiting reports on that morn- ing's flights to see if they, too, had been detected. Noting that the U-2 E0129581.6(dlill>10<25Yrs (Si Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty nor Safety (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966). pp. 259-260; OSA History, chap. 11. p. 27 (TS Codeword). OSA History, chap. II. p. 28 (TS Codeword). ret UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.