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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 3
96
Nathan Twining prepared a paper for the President outlining
"AQUATONE Operational Plans." In the meantime, President
Eisenhower had entered Walter Reed Hospital for tests for an abdomi-
nal ailment that turned out to be ileitis, requiring an operation. During
his recovery from surgery, Eisenhower would make his final decision
on the overflight program.'
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS
The President had mixed feelings about overflights of the Soviet
Union. Aware that they could provide extremely valuable intelligence
about Soviet capabilities, he, nevertheless, remained deeply con-
cerned that such flights brought with them the risk of starting a war.
From the very beginning of the U-2 program, President Eisenhower
had worked to minimize the possibility that overflights could lead to
hostilities. He had always insisted that overflights by military aircraft
were too provocative, and in 1954 he had therefore supported the
Land committee's proposal for an unarmed civilian aircraft instead of
the military reconnaissance planes favored by the Air Force. For the
same reason, Eisenhower had resisted attempts by the Air Force to
take the U-2 program away from the CIA in 1955.
In fact, the President's desire to avoid secret reconnaissance mis-
sions over the Soviet Union, with all their risks, led him to make his
famous "Open Skies" proposal in the summer of 1955, when the U-2
was still under development but making good progress. At the
Geneva summit conference on 21 July 1955, President Eisenhower
offered to provide airfields and other facilities in the United States for
the Soviet Union to conduct aerial photography of all US military in-
stallations if the Soviet Union would provide the United States with
similar facilities in Russia. Not surprisingly, Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev almost immediately rejected Eisenhower's offer.
Although the President had hoped that the Soviet Union would accept
his proposal, he was prepared for rejection. While Open Skies was
still being considered, Eisenhower had stated, "I'll give it one shot.
Then if they don't accept it, we'll fly the U-2." s
Ibid., pp. 23-25 and annex 73, "AQUATONE Operational Plans," 31 May 1956 (TS
Codeword).
Quoted in Beschloss. Mayday, p. 105.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.