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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 3
96
Nathan Twining prepared a paper for the President outlining
"AQUATONE Operational Plans." In the meantime, President
Eisenhower had entered Walter Reed Hospital for tests for an abdomi-
nal ailment that turned out to be ileitis, requiring an operation. During
his recovery from surgery, Eisenhower would make his final decision
on the overflight program.'
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS
The President had mixed feelings about overflights of the Soviet
Union. Aware that they could provide extremely valuable intelligence
about Soviet capabilities, he, nevertheless, remained deeply con-
cerned that such flights brought with them the risk of starting a war.
From the very beginning of the U-2 program, President Eisenhower
had worked to minimize the possibility that overflights could lead to
hostilities. He had always insisted that overflights by military aircraft
were too provocative, and in 1954 he had therefore supported the
Land committee's proposal for an unarmed civilian aircraft instead of
the military reconnaissance planes favored by the Air Force. For the
same reason, Eisenhower had resisted attempts by the Air Force to
take the U-2 program away from the CIA in 1955.
In fact, the President's desire to avoid secret reconnaissance mis-
sions over the Soviet Union, with all their risks, led him to make his
famous "Open Skies" proposal in the summer of 1955, when the U-2
was still under development but making good progress. At the
Geneva summit conference on 21 July 1955, President Eisenhower
offered to provide airfields and other facilities in the United States for
the Soviet Union to conduct aerial photography of all US military in-
stallations if the Soviet Union would provide the United States with
similar facilities in Russia. Not surprisingly, Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev almost immediately rejected Eisenhower's offer.
Although the President had hoped that the Soviet Union would accept
his proposal, he was prepared for rejection. While Open Skies was
still being considered, Eisenhower had stated, "I'll give it one shot.
Then if they don't accept it, we'll fly the U-2." s
Ibid., pp. 23-25 and annex 73, "AQUATONE Operational Plans," 31 May 1956 (TS
Codeword).
Quoted in Beschloss. Mayday, p. 105.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.