Documents / FOIA release

CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design."' Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar. California. 20 May 1985 (S). Johnson, "Log for…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson's revolutionary design a reality, one additional source of support was necessary…
  • p. 42 …When James Killian asked Land to head Project Three, Land had to make a major decision…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, 1 overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …a week after he had been authorized to begin the project, Kelly Johnson wrote a 23…
  • p. 69 …project staff) flew LIZ with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by eed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Batlin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermann Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a "wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 RN Chapter 6 263 Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Lockheed design for a hydrogen…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
.N.Nlbtoc‹.%%,
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 2
88
E0129581.6(d1111>10<25Yrs
IS]
These positive results from Project GENETRIX did not outweigh
the political liabilities of the international protests. CIA officials be-
came concerned that the ill will generated by balloon overfli g hts could
sour the Eisenhower administration on all overflights, including those
by the U-2, which was just about ready for deployment. Therefore.
DDCI CabeII wrote to Air Force Chief of Staff Twining in February
1956 to warn against further balloon flights because of the "additional
political pressures being generated against all balloon operations and
overflights, thus increasing the difficulties of policy decisions which
would permit such operations in the future." 7'
In addition to its concern for the future of the U-2 program, the
A gency feared that President Eisenhower's anger at balloon over-
flights might result in the curtailment of the balloon program that the
Free Europe Committee—a covert Agency operation based in West
Germany—used to release propaganda pamphlets over Eastern
Europe.
AQUATONE BRIEFINGS FOR SELECTED
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Although knowledge of the U-2 project was a closely g uarded se-
cret within both the Agency and the Eisenhower administration,
DCI Dulles decided that a few key members of Congress should be
told about the project. On 24 February 1956, Dulles met with
Senators Leverett Saltonstall and Richard B. Russell, the ranking
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and its subcom-
mittee on the CIA. He shared with them the details of Project
AQUATONE and then asked their opinion on whether some mem-
bers of the House of Representatives should also be informed. As a
result of the senators' recommendation that the senior members of
the House Appropriations Committee should be briefed, Dulles later
met with its ranking members, Representatives John Taber and
Clarence Cannon. Official Congressional knowledge of the U-2 pro-
ject remained confined to this small group for the next four years.
The House Armed Services Committee and its CIA subcommittee
did not receive a CIA briefin g on the U-2 project until after the loss
of Francis Gary . Powers's U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960.'4
" Philip G. Strong, Attachment to Memorandum for DC1 Dulics. "Project GENETRIX
Summary." 15 February 1956, OSI records (S).
" John S. Warner. Legislative Counsel. Memorandum for the Record. — A UATONE
Briefings," IS November 1957, Office of Congressional Affairs records.
SI; Warner interview (SI.
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.