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CIA/CSI/ History Staff Monograph, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 16 July 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, written in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974 and its two aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It follows their development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

  • p. 16 …An RB-29 lost in the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also…
  • p. 38 …off to about 6 percent of its sea-level thrust. Finally, low structural load factors, like…
  • p. 75 …with a boiling point of 300T at sea level. Manufacturing this special fuel required petroleum byproducts…
  • p. 80 …heavier and delivered only 10,200 pounds of thrust at sea level; the resulting --soarer UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 89 …that they could not be flown at sea level faster than 190 knots in smooth air…
  • p. 98 …southern Europe and then across the Black Sea and the desert areas of China. These bal…
  • p. 102 …working on a cover story for over- seas operations. It was important to have a plausible…
  • p. 120 …neanteagon • 724744 (8009071 4-92 Finland Baltic Sea ükranian Italy ROME IUMIS Tunisia Mediterranean Sea UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 139 …Soviet border from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and on to Afghanistan. The System…
  • p. 146 …aircraft made a run over the Black Sea. 'I here were a total of nine DB…
  • p. 148 …space launch taciitty east of the Aral Sea in Kazakhstan. None of the mission planners was…
  • p. 158 …it turned abruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west of Alaska, climbed to 110,000…
  • p. 166 …the Soviet border and over the Black Sea without entering Soviet airspace. In late August, as…
  • p. 215 …F"••• N. ' :\ ■ Caribbean Sea Ceyrnen Islands M FL) .r, Unttad ) ' ^ Gulf of Mexico NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN…
  • p. 216 …Isle of P,floo Caribbean Sea ••• Corn. Islands IWO Janss — 200 kilometers 100 200 Miles ".! SgsgalgOidaRte…
  • p. 217 SAM Sites in Cuba, August 1962 Caribbean Sea Gulf of Mexico NORTH A TLANTIC OCEAN 9…
  • p. 316 …Shortly before Leningrad, the A-12 would head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea, skirting the…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Secre FORN
Chapter
87
Although the photo intelligence gained from Project GENETRIX
was limited in quantity, it was still some of the best and most com-
plete photography obtained of the Soviet Union since World War II. It
was referred to as "pioneer" photography because it provided a base-
line for all future overhead photography. Even innocuous photos of
such things as forests and streams proved valuable in later years when
U-2 and satellite photography revealed construction activity.
Of still greater importance to the U-2 program, however, was the
data that US and NATO radars obtained as they tracked the paths of
the balloons—whose average altitude was 45,800 feet—over the
Soviet Bloc. This data provided the most accurate record to date of
high-altitude wind currents, knowledge that meteorologists were later
able to put to use to determine optimum flightpaths for U-2 flights.
One completely fortuitous development from Project
GENETRIX had nothing to do with the cameras but involved a steel
bar. This bar served a dual purpose: the rigging of the huge polyethyl-
ene gasbag was secured to the top of the bar and the camera-payload
_arid automatic-ballasting equipment was attached to the bottom. By
sheer chance, the length of the bar-91 centimeters—corresponded to
the wavelength of the radio frequency used by a Soviet radar known
by its NATO designator as TOKEN. This was an S-band radar used
by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled intercept.
The bar on the GENETR1X balloons resonated when struck by
TOKEN radar pulses, making it possible for radar operators at US
and NATO installations on the periphery of the Soviet Union to locate
a number of previously unknown TOKEN radars.
These radar findings, coupled with other intercepts made during
the balloon flights, provided extensive data on Warsaw Pact radar net-
works, radar sets, and ground-controlled interception techniques.
Analysis of these intercepts revealed the altitude capabilities and
tracking accuracy of radars, the methods used by Warsaw Pact nations
to notify each other of the balloons' passage (handing off), and the
altitudes at which Soviet aircraft could intercept the balloons. All of
this information could be directly applied to future U-2 missions.7'
Final Report, Project 119L. 1st Air Division (Meteorological Survey) Strategic Air
Command. 5 March 1956, 0-582, General Summary (TS, declassified 1979).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.