OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

TOP Si3i'QET
are expected to operate in North Atlantic and Pacific
patrol areas, while the smaller submarine because of
its more limited capabilities is more likely to follow
a pattern similar to that of J-class submarines.
The reaction of the Soviet Navy
and its submarine force to the Middle East crisis
reflects an increasing capability to deploy naval
forces in limited war situations. The rapid and
prolonged concentration of submarines in the Mediter-
ranean could not have been preplanned as part of a
normal training cycle. It was done at the .continuing
expense of disrupting the operational and overhaul
cycle and patrol patterns of Soviet western sub-
marine fleets.
(3). Surface Forces
Soviet naval surface forces
have not displayed the extended-range patrol activity
that is characteristic of the s.ubmarine forces.
By mid-1967, the number of
surface ships deployed to the Mediterranean. reached
a new high of about 40 and the level has since been
maintained. Mediterranean units engaged in frequent
operations and exercises, often reacting to movements
of the US Sixth Fleet.
Units of the Soviet Pacific
Fleet reacted to the movement of US ships during
the Pueblo crisis. The reaction was relatively .
easy since-Vladivostok headquarters and Soviet
naval bases are within one day's steaming distance
of the-Wan.sn__area .
There is little change in the
widespread deployment of intelligence collection
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