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OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

Central Intelligence Agency · 115 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 7 …the traditional NATO - Warsaw Pact arena, the Soviets have begun to seek ways of - advancing their…
  • p. 11 …the plan (see Figure 1, foldout map following this page) envisions a broad rapid advance through…
  • p. 12 …The Front from Czechoslovakia has the mission of advancing as far as the west bank of…
  • p. 21 …It was from these areas that the Soviets made their most successful advances against the Japanese…
  • p. 64 …been re- pulsed, the air units are to move forward.with the advancing ground forces. A…
  • p. 73 …Considerable discussion was devoted to the use of advanced reconnaissance aircraft to- gether with strike aircraft…
  • p. 77 …At least two advanced air- craft will have entered service by this time, and the older…
  • p. 100 …Surface forces are hampered generally by the small number of units in the fleet with advanced…
  • p. 111 …second generation, but it remains to be demonstrated that sufficient advances have been made over the…
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of time on station by making greater use of friendly
ports and anchorages for midvoyage logistic support
of F-, R-, and W-class submarines.
In spite of the constraint
imposed by the Montreux Convention--submarines are
prohibited from transiting the Turkish Straits
except for movement to and from repair bases--Soviet
submarines based in the Black Sea are making patrols
in the Mediterranean for as long as two months. This
pattern has been followed since 1964, and has been
increased in 1968.
The strain on the submarine
force in 1967 due to the Mediterranean requirement
has contributed largely to the 1968 decline in
patrols. Manning level problems may also be a rele-
vant factor, since the manning requirements for new
Y-class submarines could be draining trained sub-
mariners from the fleets.
In 1967, E class deployments
in the Atlantic increased to 10, double the number
of patrols in 1966. The Atlantic increase would
probably have been even greater without the Middle
East crisis, because five E class were diverted to
the Mediterranean during 1967. Pacific E class
deployments during 1967 reached a figure of eight.
None were detected in 1966. We continue to believe
that the E class is intended primarily for antiship
missions.
For the third consecutive year
J-class submarines have not been detected south of
the Norwegian Sea or in distant patrols in the Pa-
cific. The lack of long-range patrols and the role
of the J's in the last three Norwegian Sea exercises
provide a strong indication that these submarines
are intended for perimeter defense. One and possibly
two J-class units conducted a Mediterranean deploy-
ment in 1966, and one of them suffered a mechanical
difficulty. These patrols probably will be resumed
once operational deficiencies are corrected.
Units of all three new classes
of attack submarines have been deployed to operational
submarine bases, and out-of-area patrol activity should
begin shortly. The two large nuclear-powered classes
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.