Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Indian Air Force”2 pages
TO1PE FT C. Naval Forces The Soviet Navy's historic .missions-- defense against seaborne attack, interdiction of sea lines of communication, and antisubmarine warfare--continue in force. To these missions have been added the responsibilities for assault oper- ations in the local coastal areas in conjunction with air and ground forces and for protection of Soviet interests at sea. The navy is emphasizing the development of fleiible forces capable of projecting sea power beyond the periphery of the USSR. The effects of this policy can be seen not only in the new classes of long-range ships now entering the fleet but in expanded operations and exercises. Regular operations of submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific, and of surface and submarine forces in the Mediterranean, are now being carried out. More recently, the Soviets began to promote their naval power by "show the flag" operations in the Indian Ocean. Objectives of the new policy include the development of effective forces capable of countering Western naval power and limiting the ability of the West to intervene in "wars of national ,liberation." While the Soviets are forcefully pursuing these policies, they cannot shift the balance of naval power during the period of this estimate. Developments of the past year reveal some significant new details about the missions and responsibilities of the navy. The submarine force continues to be the most important element within the navy. Up to now defense against aircraft car- riers was the primary mission of the submarine force. With the appearance of a new class of submarine that most likely was designed specifically for antisubmarine warfare (ASW), it' seems clear that the Soviets intend to develop an open-ocean ASW sub- marine force. The navy has not had such a capability in the past, but with the continuing concern over 80 - TOF'4ECRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.