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OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

Central Intelligence Agency · 115 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 7 …the traditional NATO - Warsaw Pact arena, the Soviets have begun to seek ways of - advancing their…
  • p. 11 …the plan (see Figure 1, foldout map following this page) envisions a broad rapid advance through…
  • p. 12 …The Front from Czechoslovakia has the mission of advancing as far as the west bank of…
  • p. 21 …It was from these areas that the Soviets made their most successful advances against the Japanese…
  • p. 64 …been re- pulsed, the air units are to move forward.with the advancing ground forces. A…
  • p. 73 …Considerable discussion was devoted to the use of advanced reconnaissance aircraft to- gether with strike aircraft…
  • p. 77 …At least two advanced air- craft will have entered service by this time, and the older…
  • p. 100 …Surface forces are hampered generally by the small number of units in the fleet with advanced…
  • p. 111 …second generation, but it remains to be demonstrated that sufficient advances have been made over the…
and the program has been proceeding rapidly. The
Flogger has demonstrated the capability to fly a super-
-- ifospeeads a very'"o-aT'Ei desi while iTz saxTiiiTT
speed at high altitudes is estimated to be about Mach
2.3. It also has good STOL capabilities, and could
operate from airfields less than 2,000 feet long. An
operational variant would be primarily equipped for
an interceptor role, although it would have a second-
ary ground attack capability.
The Flogger meets the Soviet criteria
for a mobile, flexible force of fighter aircraft.
In addition to its STOL capabilities, the VG concept
would provide the aircraft with an acceptable combat
radius. The Flogger could also remain on station,
cruising subsonically, yet able to engage quickly in
supersonic pursuit. This aircraft is expected to
enter service as a tactical fighter in the 1971-72
period.
In addition, it is expected that a
new aircraft with significantly improved capabilities
in the ground attack role will be deployed in the
early 1970's. Recent evidence suggests that the
Soviets do not intend to continue replacing MIG-17
fighters with the SU-7. In view of the growing Soviet
emphasis on ground attack operations, however, it is
unlikely that the number of aircraft assigned to ground
attack units will be reduced. It is equally unlikely
that the Soviets plan to rely on the MIG-17 for a
major portion of their ground attack capability through
the mid-1970's.
The Flogger could be deployed in both
the fighter and ground attack roles, but in its pres-
ent size and configuration it may have difficulty
carrying a sufficient payload for ground attack mis-
sions. A separate aircraft is believed more likely,
probably incorporating STOL capabilities.
Several other V/STOL aircraft are
being tested, all of which employ some form of engine
thrust to achieve V/STOL capability. None of these
designs appears to be successful, however, and none
is expected to enter operational service. The only
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.