Documents / FOIA release

OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

Central Intelligence Agency · 115 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 83 …local coastal areas in conjunction with air and ground forces and for protection of Soviet interests…
  • p. 100 …A Soviet naval surface force conducted a goodwill cruise into the Indian Ocean which involved port…
the need for improved means of aerial intelligence
collection, such as television and side-looking radar.
.. -The..art'ie -_also :.exesed.a.r d- :fs .. - -
mission of data. Considerable discussion was devoted
to the use of advanced reconnaissance aircraft to-
gether with strike aircraft in search and destroy
operations.
The increased discussion of tactical
strike operations has taken place at the same time
that the YAK-28 light bomber has been phased out of
production, and when deliveries of new fighter-bombers
have decreased. sharply. This suggests that a new
aircraft is under development to meet the Soviet re-
quirement.
The fact that obsolescent IL-28 bomb-
ers remain in service with first-line units indicates
that the Soviets continue to have a strike aircraft
requirement that is not met by any of the current-
generation aircraft. The vulnerability of the IL-28
creates a need for a. new aircraft in this role. In
addition, the small payload of the YAK-28 becomes
a significant weakness in view of the growing Soviet
appreciation for nonnuclear contingencies.
The Foxbat, a new twin-jet Mikoyan-
designed aircraft, is the only aircraft known to be
under development which has significant potential in
a tactical strike role. All of the others being
tested are inferior to the Foxbat in range or payload,
or both. The others are also in a much earlier stage
of development and could not become operational until
1971 at.the earliest.
The Foxbat is believed to have been
designed as a multipurpose combat aircraft. At the
1967 Moscow air show, where the Foxbat was first
publicly displayed, the Soviet commentator described
it as capable of performing as an interceptor, a strike
aircraft, and a reconnaissance aircraft. The airframe
is suitable for equipment with a wide variety of weapons
and reconnaissance systems. With externally carried
nuclear weapons, the Foxbat can cruise at speeds near
Mach 3.0 at high altitudes, yet it retains the capabil-
- 69 -
TO1MERET

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.