Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Indian Air Force”2 pages
TO0 SECRET The SU-7 can deliver a nuclear weapon using a toss bombing technique. Facilities suspected structed at SU-7 bases with the Soviet forces in East- ern Europe. The MIG-17 Fresco fighters--in service with a little over half the ground attack regiments-- are old. Production of these subsonic aircraft ceased in 1957 and their range and payload are less than half those of the SU-7. MIG-21-equipped tactical air defense units have a secondary mission of ground attack. The effectiveness of the aircraft in this role is limited by small payload and short mission time capability. Recent evidence has indicated continued interest in the ground attack capabilities of the MIG-21 Fishbed, however, and it would clearly be employed in this role if the situation required. MIG-21' sieuinnelwith a new type of gun pod have been noted The armament of the MIG-21 in a ground attack role usually consists of rockets and guns, or two 500- to 750-pound bombs. The aircraft can theoretic- ally carry three 1,100-pound bombs, bt this would esult in a greatly reduced ran e. Soviet appreciation for the tactical employment of armed helicopters appears to be grow- ing. Transport helicopters have long heen equipped with a flexible machine gun for suppressing ground fire while landing troops. In addition, the MI-4 Hound has been observed firing rockets as long ago as the late 1950's or 1960's and is reported to have test-fired cannons on flexible mounts in that period as well. Now there are indications of an in- creasing awareness of the need to provide more fire- power against a greater variety of targets in support of ground operations. There is no evidence that the Soviets have any specially equipped gunships such as - 63 - TOPSERET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.