Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Indian Air Force”2 pages
TOPSE R ET light bomber aircraft, however, the reduction in the number of fighters was accompanied by increased de- liveries of new aircraft. The Soviets have stressed the develop- ment of mobile TAF units which can operate from dis- persed, hastily equipped airfields. Soviet doctrine calls for the air forces of a Front to disperse to predesignated alternative fields at the first sign of.hostilities to thwart enemy efforts toward air superiority through attacks on the main tactical air bases. After the enemy's initial attack has been re- pulsed, the air units are to move forward.with the advancing ground forces. A significant portion of the communications, radar, and maintenance equipment is van mounted, enabling the entire force to be re- located quickly. A major part of Soviet training is devoted to dispersal and mobility exercises, and units in the major air armies have demonstrated con- siderable proficiency in this activity. A recent development in Soviet operational procedures has been the introduction of extensive passive air defense measures at air bases. Since mid- 1967 revetting, dispersal, and camouflaging practices have appeared at most Soviet airfields. Most recently, the Soviets have begun erecting prefabricated concrete- arch aircraft shelters. In addition to the passive defense measures, increasing use of both SA-3 missiles and antiaircraft artillery batteries is evident at many airfields. The increase in air defense measures at Soviet airfields represents a marked.change from the earlier practice of lining up aircraft in parking areas for operational convenience. The defensive measures begun at this time were partly motivated by the policies of the new defense minister, Marshal Grechko, who has long been critical of earlier "lack of preparedness." It is clear, however, that the lessons of the recent Middle East crisis have provided impetus for the program. 5. Capabilities The new-generation aircraft delivered to air units in the re-equipment program were designed in the 1950's and reflect the revised concepts of the tasks of Front aviation. With the decline in impor- - 60- TOP-SECRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.