Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“The Advance”9 pages
The increased role of fighter-bombers and medium bombers has been reflected in a sharp reduction in the number of light bombers assigned to Front avia- tion. The present light bomber force of 360 aircraft is onyabout one-sixth of the pre-1960 level. In addition, only a limited number of the older bombers have been replaced in the re-equipment program. In contrast to the decline in light bombers, the number of aircraft assigned to ground attack regi- ments has nearly doubled since initiation of the mod- ernization program.in 1960. The increased emphasis on fighter-bombers results primarily from the rapidity of movement characterizing the modern battlefield, and the greater flexibility of such aircraft in this en- vironment. In addition to providing close support for ground operations, fighter-bombers can carry out inter- diction and neutralization strikes at relatively short ranges. The development of small nuclear weapons has given fighter-bombers a destructive capability previ- ously limited to bomber aircraft. Soviet fighter-bombers have low payload capabilities, however, and would have relatively limited effectiveness with conventional bombs. Air superiority and air defense of the com-- bat area continue to be important missions of Front aviation. The operational methods for these missions were revised in the 1950's, however. Independent oper- ations by fighter aircraft to rout enemy air groupings were deemed obsolete, as was the concept of protecting ground operations with an umbrella of fighter aircraft. Such tactics had been made ineffective, according to Soviet military doctrine, by the number and variety of the enemy's means of air attack, both aircraft and missiles. Air superiority is now to.be achieved pri- marily through strikes at enemy airfields executed by both aircraft and tactical missiles. In addition, part of the air defense of the immediate battlefield area and rear positions is now provided by surface- to-air missiles. Theater air defense still depends primarily on fighter aircraft, however, with increased emphasis on intercepting enemy strike aircraft forward of the battlefield area. These revised operational theories led to a reduction in the number of fighter aircraft deployed with TAF air defense regiments. Unlike the case of - 59 - TOP SECRET|
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.