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OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

Central Intelligence Agency · 115 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 83 …local coastal areas in conjunction with air and ground forces and for protection of Soviet interests…
  • p. 100 …A Soviet naval surface force conducted a goodwill cruise into the Indian Ocean which involved port…
include the permanent stationing of Soviet ground
forces in Czechoslovakia, will probably be aimed
at developing combat-ready Soviet forces, approxi-
matinga rn, inte Czech sector.
The direction of these trends is toward
a substantial increase in Soviet requirements for
personnel and equipment for the ground forces and,
consequently, in their expenditures for new facilities,
operations, and maintenance. In terms of forces, they
might raise the number of Category I divisions by as
many as 30 and require substantial additional army
and Front-level support forces.
The cost of satisfying all of these
requirements would be quite high without offsetting
reductions. Substantial savings might be made in
time through a radical reorganization of the ground
forces establishment, which currently retains many
bases and activities which apparently make little
direct contribution to military capabilities. There
is no evidence, however, that the Soviets seriously
contemplate any such reorganization. Inertia and
the tenacity of special interests are more likely
to prevail. The requirements for other military
programs, particularly in the strategic forces are
also tending to rise sharply, and no significant
savings are in prospect there.
The magnitude of these competing require-
ments is so great that compromises will almost
certainly be necessary. We expect that, at least
for the next year or so, the highest priority in the
ground forces is likely to be accorded to increasing
Soviet combat readiness in the forces for Central
Europe. The buildup opposite China might be slowed
down to accommodate the unexpected requirements re-
sulting from the Czech crisis. In any case, we
believe that the Soviet ground forces will continue
to increase in size and in combat readiness for the
next several years.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.