Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Indian Air Force”2 pages
The KA-25K medium flying crane probably will enter service with tactical units to fulfill a number of functions, including troop carrying and The Soviets are developing a huge new transport aircraft--a winged helicopter--for short takeoff and landing operations with a takeoff weight on the order of 200,000 pounds, more than twice that of their giant MI-6 and MI-10 helicopters, and a pay- load of some 30 tons. This aircraft could signifi- cantly increase Soviet short-'range (under 200 nautical miles) airlift capabilities, but is not likely to enter service until well into the 1970's. 7. Airlift Capabilities a. Expanding Mission As Soviet military airlift capacity and range has increased, the Soviets have enlarged their demands on Military Transport Aviation (VTA). They now expect VTA to .support the airborne troops in independently neutralizing or occupying strategic objectives, of which the recent occupation of Prague is a vivid example. The Soviets have begun to rely more heavily on military airlift in support of their military-political adventures such as those in the Middle East. The most militarily significant example has been the delivery of fighter aircraft to Middle Eastern and North African countries following the June 1967 war. It is likely that this reliance will increase dramatically in the 1970's as new aircraft with range and payload capabilities become available. Although the airlift potential will continue to in- crease with the assignment of new aircraft, Soviet airborne intervention forces would still face the possibility of destruction while en route to their objective. Fighter escort from the USSR is, gen- erally speaking, only possible to a radius of 500 nm. - 50 - TO SECRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.