OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

exist only on paper, or as portions of the civilian
economy. Category II divisions can probably be
mobilized and deployed in a matter of days. They
cannot be sustained in combat more than a few days,
however, without full logistical support by the
Front rear services.
We believe that the Warsaw Pact is
capable of mobilizing the men and vehicles required
to organize the five Fronts intended for Central
Europe in a matter of days if the process is not
interrupted-by hostile military action. However,
their complete integration as functioning, combat-
effective units, particularly at the Front level,
is likely to require more time. In an emergency
the mobilization of the Carpathian and Belorussian
Fronts and their movement into Central Europe could
probably be accomplished in two weeks or less,
although some important elements of the Front rear
services might still be incomplete at that time.
In a situation where time was of their choosing,
the Soviets would probably plan to take about three
weeks to complete the reinforcement.
The initial combat effectiveness of
Category II divisions, and of armies made up mostly
from such divisions, will certainly be much lower
than that of the GSFG. However, these forces are
probably not intended to meet fully combat-effective
NATO divisions. Rather the Soviets would expect to
commit them after their first-echelon Fronts had
endeavored to reduce NATO's capabilities.
6. Equipment Modernization
New evidence
the Soviet
inventory of armored personnel carriers probably
includes about 14,000 vehicles of all models, about
half of which are still obsolescent BTR-152's. This
total is only a little more than half the estimated
requirement for.APC's and is consistent with other
evidence which indicates that only Category.I
divisions are fully equipped with APC's and that
some low-strength divisions have few or none.
- 47 -
TOF GRT