Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Mission Control”3 pages
'iQPiCRET that vehicles and drivers are called up on practice alerts during which they report to their designated units. We have observed large numbers of what appear __.t"o4aQ1=1n-vezi s---r~key- divisional installations during the summer training season. Redundancy is built into the mobilization system in an effort to make up for its inherent shortcomings. In practice mobilizations, some low-. strength Soviet and Eastern European divisions have reportedly been overfilled by as much as 20 percent of their wartime personnel strength. The Warsaw Pact mobilization plan is complex and vulnerable to interruptions if attempted after the beginning of hostilities. More than 21,000 vehicles would be needed to complete the mobilization of the low-strength divisions in the Belorussian and Carpathian MD's and the three additional armies in the Baltic and Kiev MD's, The army and-Front-level organizations of these forces would probably require from 15,000 to 20,000 additional vehicles. The movement of mobilized Warsaw Pact forces from their peacetime location into the theater of operations, and thence into combat, is closely related to the mobilization process itself. In Warsaw Pact doctrine, mobilization and deployment are viewed as integrated components of a single process--reinforcement. _ the classified writings of tnePact countries invariably portray mobilization and deployment as taking place in reaction to some western initiative--either an outright attack against East Germany or Czechoslovakia, or some other action which causes a sudden hei htening of tension-, However, the selective mobilization an eployment of Soviet and Polish forces in prep- aration for the Czechoslovak intervention, although smaller in scale, probably approximates the time schedule they would plan for in a deliberate rein- forcement. - 45 - TO SEG1T
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.