Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“US Navy”7 pages
The Warsaw Pact countries have mobili- zation plans providing for the rapid assembly and assignment to units of the additional manpower a nde vei--es n1ee-de-d-To1-u---Fh-eout co mat units and develop the Front organizations, Detailed procedures are laid down in the Soviet military districts and in the Eastern European countries for implementing the mobilization plans. The Soviets maintain a large pool of reserve manpower which includes not only able- bodied former servicemen but also men without prior military service who have certain technical quali- fications such as drivers, mechanics, and medical personnel. Reservists can be called up for active duty as individuals or as members of reserve (or "militarized") units which are called up together. These reserve units are formed in civilian motor transport organizations, hospitals, and other state institutions. The Soviet system also involves the registration of civilian vehicles and other materiel such as engineer equipment. These items are inspected periodically by military authorities and classified - according to their condition, age, and suitability for mobilization. Vehicles and equipment in the organized reserve units as well as other civilian items are registered. The Warsaw Pact reserve manpower pool and vehicle inventory is large enough to provide all the men and vehicles needed to complete the forces earmarked for use in Central Europe in the early stages of war. The efficiency with which the mobilization process would be carried out is less certain. The magnitude and complexity of the preparations and the task of implementation almost ensure that it will not go smoothly. Both the Soviets and Eastern Europeans, however, are known to have repeatedly practiced elements of the mobilization process. There is evidence that reservists are called up for periods of one or two months but at rather long intervals of three to five years. There are also reports - 44 -
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.