Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Mission Control”3 pages
TOPSi R-ET would be intended to reinforce and replenish the forces in the central region or elsewhere. Initially it would probably include those forces in the western USSR which were not committed to the Fronts and which are organized into field armies in peacetime. We believe that the two tank armies in the Kiev MD, each of which currently has four Category II divisions, would constitute the core of the strategic reserve. One additional Category II division, not assigned to either army, would probably also be available. Both armies have combat support units including Scud brigades, artillery brigades, engineer regiments, and probably surface-to-air missile units. Both armies and the additional divi- sion could probably be available for deployment from their present locations within about two weeks.after mobilization began. Two Category III divisions in Kiev MD would not be available. 5. Mobilization and Deployment Mobilization of men and vehicles on a large scale and the rapid deployment of forces into the European central region are essential prereq- uisites of Warsaw Pact preparations for war. In peacetime the Soviets and their Eastern European allies keep only about two-thirds of their ground forces at sufficient personnel and equipment strength for immediate combat. These consist mainly of the Soviet forces in Germany and Poland plus a part of the Czech, East German, and Polish tactical units. A few additional Soviet forces in the western USSR are also kept ready for deployment into Central Europe. The rest of the combat and combat support units would have to be filled up with men and vehicles and moved up to 600 miles westward before they could be used. Furthermore, most of the Front rear services organization and a large part of the field army service support would have to be mobilized to support the deployment and com- bat use of the Eastern European divisions and the Soviet reinforcement. - 43 - TDP-9EGET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.