OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

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We believe the Belorussian MD could
produce a Front which could probably complete its
mobilization and deployment into western Poland or
1y-t-wo ortree we eks -T ii-ron
would consist of about 140,0.00 men with 3,100 tanks,
supported by 250 aircraft, about 50 nuclear-capable
missile or rocket launchers, 650 artillery pieces
and 150 multiple-round rocket launchers.
f. Baltic Military District
The 'Baltic MD contains a combined-
arms army--the 11th Guards Army--and an airborne
division which are available for the central region..
There is also a tactical air army of 260 aircraft.
Between 17 July and 10 August 1968 the 11th Guards
Army, which had one Category I and three or four
Category II divisions, was fully mobilized and
began a movement into north-central Poland. By the
end of August it was located in the area of the East
German-Czechoslovak border, and there are indications
that it will remain in Czechoslovakia as part of the.
Soviet occupation force.
g. Soviet Forces in Poland
The Soviet Northern Group of Forces
(NGF) in Poland has only two tank divisions, both
of which are probably Category I. However, the NGF
has combat support units approximating those in a
typical Soviet field army, and also has a large
tactical air army with 290 aircraft. There is no
evidence to indicate the intended wartime role of
NGF. Its units could be used to reinforce either
the GSFG or the Polish Front, or they could form
a part of .a theater reserve. Apparently none of
the NGF ground forces were involved in the Czecho-
slovak intervention. However, about 75 aircraft
of the 37th Tactical Air Army from NGF were used
in Czechoslovakia.
h. Strategic Reserve
Simultaneously with the mobilization
and deployment of the Fronts, the Soviets would .
probably begin developing a strategic reserve under
the direct control of the High Command. The reserve
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