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OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

Central Intelligence Agency · 115 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 7 …the traditional NATO - Warsaw Pact arena, the Soviets have begun to seek ways of - advancing their…
  • p. 11 …the plan (see Figure 1, foldout map following this page) envisions a broad rapid advance through…
  • p. 12 …The Front from Czechoslovakia has the mission of advancing as far as the west bank of…
  • p. 21 …It was from these areas that the Soviets made their most successful advances against the Japanese…
  • p. 64 …been re- pulsed, the air units are to move forward.with the advancing ground forces. A…
  • p. 73 …Considerable discussion was devoted to the use of advanced reconnaissance aircraft to- gether with strike aircraft…
  • p. 77 …At least two advanced air- craft will have entered service by this time, and the older…
  • p. 100 …Surface forces are hampered generally by the small number of units in the fleet with advanced…
  • p. 111 …second generation, but it remains to be demonstrated that sufficient advances have been made over the…
When full mobilized and deployed
the Carpathian Front would have about 150,000 men
and 2,800 tanks. It would be supported by about _
-rriaTE-a -cear-capa le--misse and rock-
et launchers, 1,000 light and medium field artillery
pieces, and 1.50 multiple-round rocket launchers.
e. Belorussian Front
The Belorussian Military District
is similar in size and organization to the Carpathian
MD but is at a lower stage of combat readiness and
has less support. It is probably intended to form
a Front for use in the central region.
There are three field armies, one
combined arms and two tank, and a tactical air
army in the district. Prior to the Czech crisis,
none of the field armies was 'ready for immediate
deployment. The 28th Army has four divisions, of
which two were Category I and two Category II.
The 5th Guards Tank Army 'and the 7th Tank Army
have a total of seven divisions, all of which were
probably Category II. The three divisions of the
5th Guards Tank Army were mobilized for the Czech
crisis but not deployed. The Belorussian MD has
an additional combat-ready motorized rifle division
not assigned to any army. An airborne division is
also located in the MD but is subordinate to the
Airborne Forces Headquarters at Moscow.
There are fewer combat support units
in the Belorussian MD than in any of the other Soviet
potential Fronts for Central Europe. Neither of the
tank armies has an artillery brigade, and the artil-
lery unit for the combined-arms army apparently 'is
only of battalion size. Only two possible Scud
brigades have been detected. Each army does have a.
surface-to-air missile regiment and an engineer pon-
ton unit. The engineer units appear to be at low
personnel and equipment strength. Each of the tank
armies appears to have a medium antiaircraft gun
brigade of about 100 guns, apparently in cadre
status. Front-level support consists of an artil-
lery division at reduced or cadre strength and a
tank transporter unit with about 350 transport
vehicles.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.