Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
Front support units include two artillery divisions of about 1_50 guns each, both of which are probably at low or cadre strength, _________ - plus-.a-Ganeft-surf amenn.oa rLmmiik~ . tanc-a- tank. transporter unit with about 150 heavy trans- port vehicles. The command and control organization of the Carpathian Front and most of its Front-level support units are probably manned and equipped at no more than half strength. We believe that the Carpathian MD has a higher level of.combat readiness than any other MD in the USSR. The tank army could probably complete its mobilization and deployment into Czecho- slovakia in about one week. The other two armies could move their combat-ready divisions into Czecho- slovakia within a week, but the remainder of the two armies and the front support units probably would require an additional week to move up. The 38th Army controlled four divisions in the Carpathian MD which threatened and later intervened in Czechoslovakia. These in- cluded all three combat-ready divisions of the 13th and 38th Armies, plus one from the 8th Tank Army. A portion of the Carpathian MD's forces were mobi- lized under cover of the July-August rear services exercise to support this deployment. As many as three Category II divisions from the 13th Army were mobilized at the same time but not deployed. The Czechoslovakian situation probably obliged the Soviets to deploy an army made up of divisions detached from several other armies because the deployment occurred well before the partial mobilization. The only army in the western USSR which had all of its divisions combat ready at that time was the 8th Tank Army. The 8th Tank Army was probably considered less suitable for the purpose since all its divisions were tank divi- sions. These are less useful than motorized rifle divisions for the kinds of activity, including occupation duties and combat in cities, which were probably anticipated. Moreover, the Soviets may have preferred to keep most of the 8th Tank Army available for its primary contingency role against NATO. - 40 -
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.