OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

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The major weakness of the Polish
Front stems from its dependence on a complex and
awkward mobilization procedure, and from the neces-
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before they could be committed in an offensive. The
critical nature of these mobilization and movement
actions lies not only in the fact that the operations
of the Polish forces depend on them but also in their
vulnerability to interruption if attempted after
hostilities begin.
d. Carpathian Front
Before the Czech intervention, the
Soviets had planned to form a Front from the
Carpathian Military District to replace the Czech
forces after the initial hostilities in the central
region. The Front would be formed from existing
units of the Carpathian MD, supplemented by mobili-
zation. These forces consist of three field armies,
a tactical air army, and some combat and service
support units.
The three field armies include the
8th Tank Army with four tank divisions, and two
combined arms armies, the 13th and 38th, each with
four motorized rifle divisions. All four of the
tank divisions in the 8th Tank Army probably are
combat ready, but its support units are probably at
reduced strength and would require some mobilization
of personnel and vehicles to become combat ready.
Prior to the Czech intervention, the 13th Army had
one combat-ready division while the 38th Army had
two. The remaining five motorized rifle divisions
were Category II with reduced personnel and equip-
ment strength, as were the combat and service support
units of these armies.
In addition to its divisions, each
of the Carpathian armies has a Scud brigade, an
artillery brigade, a surface-to-air missile regiment,
and an engineer ponton and assault crossing regiment.
One of the combined-arms armies also probably has a
separate heavy tank and assault gun regiment.
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