Documents / FOIA release

OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

Central Intelligence Agency · 115 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 83 …local coastal areas in conjunction with air and ground forces and for protection of Soviet interests…
  • p. 100 …A Soviet naval surface force conducted a goodwill cruise into the Indian Ocean which involved port…
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created during mobilization. Part of these units
would be formed using cadres from existing peace-
time organizations and functions, but many would
-- - e -==u3is==fteea-ts-t-=nt@
civilian-institutions such as hospitals or trans-
port organizations.
As is the case with Czechoslovakia,
the rapid creation and deployment of a Front's
command, control, and support organization is the
most critical and complex task involved in preparing
the Polish armed forces for war. Although the tac-
tical elements of the Front first-echelon could
begin deployment, and even enter combat, largely on
the basis of predetermined contingency plans, their
subsequent direction and support would depend on
the capability of the Front to begin carrying out
all its functions within a few days after mobili-
zation begins.
When fully mobilized, the Polish
Front would probably have about 200,000 men and
3,700 tanks. It would be supported by some 200
aircraft, the bulk of which are the older MIG-15's
and MIG-19's, by about 65 nuclear-capable missile
and rocket launchers, as many as 1,000 towed artil-
lery pieces of light and medium calibers, and about
170 multiple-round rocket launchers.
The main strength of the Polish
Front, as with the Soviet Front in Germany, lies
in its large number of tanks. The Polish infantry
is relatively light and has very few armored person-
nel carriers. Most of the infantry is probably
transported in cargo trucks.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.