Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Headquarters”5 pages
The GSFG's relative lightness in infantry capability, coupled with its small provision of artillery--all of which is towed and therefore qwi te - l-ine b~ae-~t ar'-- }tackmihtra i.. t~ seriously in a combat situation which did not favor tanks. GSFG divisions are capable of only about three days of intensive combat with their organic mobile supplies and depend on the early institution of full-scale logistical support from the rear to maintain offensive momentum. This support must be provided mainly by the Front, since the armies probably have no more than a small mobile reserve of one or two additional days of supply. We believe that the GSFG Front-level organization exists in peacetime. Analysis of GSFG indicates that its Front-level rear services organization is probably maintained at full strength in peacetime, b. Czechoslovakian Front Prior to the Soviet intervention, the Czechs were responsible for organizing a Front to cover the Warsaw Pact southern flank in the central region. This Front was charged with the mission of securing crossings over the Rhine in its zone of operations but, in reality, the Soviets probably expected it to do no more than wear down NATO forces and defend Czechoslovakia long enough for Soviet reinforcements to get there. We expect that Czechoslovakia will continue to maintain armed forces of about the current size and that these forces will be available to the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets probably will judge their reliability as low in the foreseeable future and take measures to offset this as much as possible. These measures might include retention of Soviet units inside Czechoslovakia, strengthening of Soviet forces in Poland and the western USSR, or both. In addition, they may also assign Soviet officers to positions where they could more directly influence the Czech high command. - 35 - TO 'SEGRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.