Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“The Advance”9 pages
TOP &ER 4: In an emergency, the Soviet Front in Germany would probably absorb the two East German armies-and their _ix C_ateaorv I division s_. Th Although the East German divi- sions are combat ready, some mobilization of vehicles and personnel would probably be required to complete the armies. With its East German allies, the Front organized from GSFG would have about 350,000 men and 6,500 tanks. It would be supported by 730 aircraft, 150 nuclear-capable missile and rocket launchers, 1,600 artillery pieces (mostly of light or medium calibers, none of them self-propelled) and 300 multiple rocket launchers. GSFG units train rigorously, although some aspects of this training, such as tank gunnery and small arms tactical firing, appear unrealistic. Their training exercises are designed to approximate as nearly as possible the emergency roles of the participants and thus serve as rehearsals. Practice alerts are held frequently, and divisions are re- portedly required to be capable of assembling outside their garrison areas in combat-ready condition in two hours. To meet these standards the Soviets follow such practices as maintaining full combat loads of ammunition and POL on vehicles, and strictly con- trolling the whereabouts of troops during off-duty hours. On the whole, GSFG is a large and powerful force with a good potential for penetrations with massed armor in areas suitable for tank movement. However, its infantry strength is low, and it does not yet have armored personnel carriers (APC's) in sufficient numbers or of appropriate design to match the speed and flexibility of the tank forces. Al- though Soviet tactica. doctrine emphasizes infantry combat in moving APC's, the current low allocation of APC's to GSFG motorized rifle battalions tends to destroy small-unit integrity and crowds the riflemen inside the vehicles so as to hinder their weapons firing. Furthermore, about half of the APC's are still of the old BTR-152 type, which are not amphib- ious and have poor off-road mobility. - 32 - TOPSEGRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.