Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“US Navy”7 pages
In the circa-1961 war plans, the first echelon of the Front was formed mainly by the Soviet forces stationed in Germany, while the second echelon was providea. by tne reliuirlug cuILml fromL Lhe~ wese USSR. The third echelon was to come mainly from units newly formed after mobilization began, and may have been intended as reserves and replacements. It does not seem likely that any divisions with the western MD armies were a part of the so-called third echelon, since this would have destroyed the integrity of these armies by stretching out their deployment over a month or more of time and would have resulted in-their simultaneously having some divisions in com- bat in Central Europe while others were still mobi- lizing inside the USSR. The only mention in the Soviet classified articles of cadre divisions in field armies was a statement by Lt. Gen. S. Andryushchenko in an article entitled "The Deployment and Forward Movement of a Combined-Arms Army of a Border Mili- tary District in the Initial Period of a War." He said: In addition, we studied the combined- arms army made up of four or five divi- sions (two or three of them up to strength and the rest in cadre form or at reduced strength) .... " This somewhat ambiguous statement may indicate that the author was uncertain of the exact status of the divisions not up to strength, or that he considered the terms "reduced strength" and "cadre form" to be. virtually synonomous. It is worth noting that, at the time of writing, Andryushchenko was the deputy commander of a separate army corps in the North Caucasus MD which may well have contained cadre divisions. Other authors discussed only two categories of readiness in the context of early Front operations. The clearest statement is by Maj. Gen. A. Klyukanov in "The Most Urgent Problems - 26 - TOPSERET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.