Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
T ' ~SEGRET Of the remaining 28 divisions, 26 have equipment shortages ranging between 600 and 1,000 major equipment items. Our observations indieate hat- the shortage is mainly in general-purpose wheeled . vehicles and armored personnel carriers. These divi- sions probably have all of their tanks and artillery. Two divisions in the Kiev MD, neither of which is part of an army, have no more than 800 vehicles and probably lack some of their combat equipment as well. About 800 of the major equipment items in a fully equipped Soviet division consist of combat and special-purpose equipment which has no civilian equivalent. The other 1,400 to 1,500 items are mainly general-purpose vehicles. At least seven of the 26 equipment- short divisions were mobilized during the Czech crisis and their personnel and equipment levels were increased to war strength. There are no field armies in the Moscow MD. This fact, along with the evidence that none of its three to five line divisions is fully equipped and the absence of army- and Front- level combat support, indicates that the ground forces in the Moscow MD are not intended for use as early reinforcements in the European central region. b. Manning Levels and Combat Readiness We have reassessed Soviet classified writings on reinforcement in light of new evidence on Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces and find that all of the divisions in the field armies of the western USSR are probably intended to be available for deployment to Europe, immediately after they have been filled up to wartime personnel and equip- ment strength. There are probably three categories of Soviet divisions: Category I consisting of divi- sions manned at between 80 and 100 percent strength and with most or all of their equipment; Category II manned at up to 50 percent personnel strength and with 50 to 70 percent of their equipment in- cluding all their tanks and artillery but with sub- stantial shortages in APC's; and Category III manned - 24 - TOP $E.RET
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.