Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“US Navy”7 pages
control of general purpose forces. A Front would consist of about three field armies and a tactical air army plus combat and service support. The rear services of the Front are responsible for most of the administrarive. suppmL u0t the COunu.>aL unIILs, IlUldim supply, evacuation, medical service, construction, and maintenance. The very low provision of these kinds of support at division and army level makes the efficient operation of the Front's rear services from the very beginning of military operations a critical requirement, since the combined total of mobile stocks of POL and ammunition in divisions and field armies would be sufficient for only four to five days of intensive combat. Short-range tactical airborne sup- port is provided by medium and heavy helicopters assigned to the tactical air components of a Front. The overall strength and disposition of the helicopter forces, however, are not adequate for the lift of large ground units. The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) is virtually a Front in being. As such, it is the only completely mobilized Warsaw Pact Front. Several potential Fronts planned for Central Europe are known to exist. Prior to the Czechoslovak invasion the Polish and Czech military establishments were each responsible for forming a Front in wartime, as was the Soviet Carpathian Military District (MD) and probably the Belorussian MD. In each of these potential Front areas there were currently three or more field armies, a tactical air army, and limited additional combat and service su _port units.I For each potential Front, except he GFG, much of the higher command and control structure and a majority of the service support units would have to be created by mobilization. Other potential Soviet and East European Fronts probably exist in Bulgaria, the southern and far eastern USSR, and possibly, in the northwestern USSR. Ground armies and tactical air armies are stationed in each of these regions. - 21 - TOP -SECRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.