OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

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our belief that divisions are typical
of Soviet divisions in East Germa y-a-nu--n-at their
assessed equipment levels are correct.
Analysis of
he divisions in the western USSR and aong
order reveals that eleven divisions in the
western USSR and five in the Far East MD are probably
equipped at about the same level as GSFG divisions.
Their equipment levels and their anparent high levels
of training activity
indicate Ltat these divisions also are
probably manned at sufficient strength to be available
for immediate deployment.
b. Armies
The Soviet field army approximates
a US corps in size and operational function. Soviet
field armies have from three to five line divisions
and additional combat and service support units.
Armies are of two types: the tank army in which all
or a majority of the divisions are tank divisions,
and the combined-arms army in which all or a majority
of the divisions are motorized rifle.
The field army also has administrative
responsibilities and is provided with service support
units sufficient to perform these functions at a
minimal level while relying on the Front rear services
for major logistical support of the tactical units.
For example, the army mobile depots carry only one
or two days of supplies for all of the army units.
Depending on the numbers and types of divisions and
support units assigned, the wartime strengths of
Soviet field armies would probably range from as low
as 35,000 to as high as 50,000 men.
Soviet
classified writings cons istenfly indicate thast the
divisions are intended to fight in armies rather than
as independent forces. This same evidence indicates
that the Soviets intend to commit their armies to
combat essentially as they are organized in peacetime.
Although there are no inherent constraints which would
prevent eventual reorganization, the transition from
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