Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Headquarters”5 pages
The commitment of Soviet naval and air forces on a continuing basis. to the Mediterranean carea fore- shadows further such deployment elsewhere. However, the USSR's present:naval capabilities place constraints on the potential number.of such ventures. Generally speaking, the Soviets need a total of.three combatant vessels for each one kept deployed, and therefore another undertaking the, size of that in the Mediter-. ranean would severely strain the Soviet Navy. For the last 15 months the Soviets have maintained a force of about ten surface combatants in the Mediterranean, in addition to .the militarily more significant submarine force (see Figure ,, below).. Since March 1968, Soviet naval aviation has been oper- ating a small TU-16 reconnaissance squadron based in the United Arab Republic It is the first Soviet naval.air deployment abroad and further reflects the new Soviet willingness to use military power away from the security of the homeland. Figure 2 USSR: Combatant Strength of Mediterranean Squadron . June 1964 -August 1968 SURFACE SHIPS 15 10 - 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 SUBMARINES - All types - 10 Nuclear-powered - 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 - 10
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.