OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

TOP-SEORF ,
normal peacetime use of ships in civilian trade,
many would be unavailable on short notice. It is
estimated that about 25 percent of the total number
of ships in each fleet area are at sea or otherwise
unavailable at any given time.
Moreover, sealift operations would
require the use of port facilities and in most cases
would also require convoy escort. Only limited
convoy defense exercises have been noted, in the
Northern and Black Sea fleet areas in 1966 and again
in the Northern Fleet in 1968, suggesting that sea-
lift operations have a low priority in naval strategy.
5. Eastern European Naval Forces
Warsaw Pact navies of Eastern Europe are
making modest increases in their ability to defend
their coasts in combination with the Soviet Navy.
The gradual increase in capability and readiness
results chiefly from intensified combined exercises
in the past year and not from new transfers of Soviet
weapons.
Pact plans for defense of the Baltic
approaches call for a coordinated defense in depth.
An aggressor force, detected by picket ships guarding
the main channels, would come under successive attacks
by East German and Polish aircraft, by East German
torpedo and guided-missile craft, and by a similar
Soviet surface force operating from Swinoujscie,
Poland. Polish guided-missile and torpedo boats
would probably be committed next, followed by air-
craft and major combatant ships of the Soviet Baltic
Fleet.
Warsaw Pact navies have also emphasized
efforts to upgrade their antisubmarine defenses in
the Baltic in the past year, and Polish submarines
have operated in the North and Norwegian seas on an
increasing scale.
Poland con{timie orun radil- --mphibious
assault capability. rigade
strength--about 2,.10 troops This
force will probably double b -Lore---ro r--i ndi-
cations point to an increasing amphibious role for
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