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OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

Central Intelligence Agency · 115 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 83 …local coastal areas in conjunction with air and ground forces and for protection of Soviet interests…
  • p. 100 …A Soviet naval surface force conducted a goodwill cruise into the Indian Ocean which involved port…
TOFSRGRET
fleet units operating beyond the cover of shore-
based aircraft. The SNAF has little experience
that is applicable to operations of this kind,
however, and it will be some time before the
carrier-based force can be used effectively.
The deployment of a SNAF BE-12
unit to the UAR provides the first airborne ASW
support for the Soviet Mediterranean squadron.
Even the three aircraft now in the UAR represent
a major.addition to Soviet ASW forces in this area.
The deployment of a few more BE-12's, together with
the Moskva-class carrier and its KA-25 ASW heli-
copters, would substantially increase the ASW
capabilities of the Mediterranean squadron.
c. Naval Infantry and Amphibious
Forces
The naval infantry has reached a
level of about 10,000 men and continues to grow at
a slow but steady pace. There are more than 100
landing ships to serve this elite marine force.
The force has a capability for a brigade-size landing
in each fleet area but no capability for long-range,
opposed amphibious operations.
The amphibious ships deployed to the
Mediterranean serve to enhance Soviet prestige and
influence with the Arabs, one of the main objectives
The present group of Soviet amphib-
ious ships in the Mediterranean could transport a
small force in an unopposed landing. This limited
capability could be increased if the two helicopter
carriers could be used in an assault operation, but
this is unlikely in view of the small number of
troops that could be carried--a company-size force
on each carrier. In an opposed situation, these
limited amphibious capabilities would be further
reduced because of the absence of support forces
that would be required.
- 101 -
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.