Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Indian Air Force”2 pages
TOFSRGRET fleet units operating beyond the cover of shore- based aircraft. The SNAF has little experience that is applicable to operations of this kind, however, and it will be some time before the carrier-based force can be used effectively. The deployment of a SNAF BE-12 unit to the UAR provides the first airborne ASW support for the Soviet Mediterranean squadron. Even the three aircraft now in the UAR represent a major.addition to Soviet ASW forces in this area. The deployment of a few more BE-12's, together with the Moskva-class carrier and its KA-25 ASW heli- copters, would substantially increase the ASW capabilities of the Mediterranean squadron. c. Naval Infantry and Amphibious Forces The naval infantry has reached a level of about 10,000 men and continues to grow at a slow but steady pace. There are more than 100 landing ships to serve this elite marine force. The force has a capability for a brigade-size landing in each fleet area but no capability for long-range, opposed amphibious operations. The amphibious ships deployed to the Mediterranean serve to enhance Soviet prestige and influence with the Arabs, one of the main objectives The present group of Soviet amphib- ious ships in the Mediterranean could transport a small force in an unopposed landing. This limited capability could be increased if the two helicopter carriers could be used in an assault operation, but this is unlikely in view of the small number of troops that could be carried--a company-size force on each carrier. In an opposed situation, these limited amphibious capabilities would be further reduced because of the absence of support forces that would be required. - 101 - 'IOPNMRJ ____T
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.