Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Indian Air Force”2 pages
the active ASW zone into the open ocean because the fleet will have to defense itself and its logistic train 1.ronii submarine attack, he new classes o.L ships, submarines, and aircraft: currently being. introduced will substantially improve Soviet capa- bilities for this kind. of. operation. Ultimately these programs. will lead to an improved capability against the Polaris-type submarine. For the present and immediate future, however, Soviet capabilities to detect, localize, and destroy Polaris submarines j in the open ocean are extremely limited. The first significant improvement in anti-Polaris capabilities is expected to occur in the Mediterranean. The Soviets now have a large surface ship and submarine force deployed there with limited but growing. antisubmarine warfare capabilities. These ASW forces are believed to be deployed primarily for fleet defense. However, restricted passages in the Mediterranean, particularly the Gibraltar and. Sicily straits, offer optimum areas for deployment of new ASW platforms. It is in the Mediterranean that we expect the Soviets to make their first strides in improving their .anti-Polaris.capability. Soviet ASW forces have not achieved any apparent breakthroughs in weapons. or tactics. However, considerable. resources are being allocated to production of ships, submarines, airplanes, heli- copters, and weapons designed for antisubmarine warfare. Observation of Soviet naval exercises has indicated more realistic.training, the use of capable and modern target submarines, good cooper- ation between air and surface units, and submarine- versus-submarine torpedo firing exercises. While the Soviets have long recognized the value of a submarine in combat against another submarine, their attack submarines have not been effective ASW units. During the past year, however, three new classes of attack submarines entered the fleet, and we believe that one of these could be considerably more effective than older classes against Western submarines. The submarine with the greatest ASW potential is a nuclear-powered unit being built at Gor'kiy and designated.C class. Only limited data are available, but indications are - 98 - iTPSEJCPET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.