Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“US Navy”7 pages
TOP .EC1PET ships, particularly in the vicinity of Pnlaric vuh- marine bases, or the worldwide deployment of ocean- ographic research ships. A Soviet naval surface force conducted a goodwill cruise into the Indian Ocean which involved port visits to eight countries. The cruise, which lasted four months, served to show the flag and clearly indicates Soviet interest in the area. Surface forces are hampered generally by the small number of units in the fleet with advanced combat capabilities and by their dis- pers.al among fleet areas. The Soviets are forced to retain older and less effective combat units to supplement the new units. Surface forces in the Pacific are the most restricted, because they cannot easily be.augmented by units of other fleet areas, as in western USSR. In the western fleet areas, the Soviets have nearly 150 majorsurface units available--37 in the Northern Fleet, 54 in the Baltic, and 53 in the- Black Sea. Such forces how- ever, have limited antiair and submarine defense capability and would be combat limited also by logistic support. The limitations of the surface forces are mainly the result of higher priorities accorded to submarine forces. b. Antisubmarine Warfare Forces The Soviet Navy today has a limited but growing capability to combat enemy submarines. Near Soviet coasts, where the requirement to prevent intrusion by enemy submarines would be most critical, Soviet surface and air patrol craft, fixed defensive systems, and shore-based helicopters can all be brought to bear against a target within a short time after detection. Reaction times, as well as detection, classification, and attack capabilities,'are gradually degraded as the distance from coastline increases. At 300 to 400 miles, overall ASW capability becomes poor. During the past three or four years Soviet naval operations have expanded away from the coasts. This trend will have the effect of extending - 97 - TOP SECRT|
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.