III-018 “The Theory of Military Art Needs Review,” by Col. Gen. A.I. Gastilovich and Lt. Gen. I.A. Tolkonyuk, special collection of Military Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 1960, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 18 December 1961,

' especially massive, organized according to territorial character-
~ istics and trained without being pulled out of production. We
have something similar now in the form of civilian formations of the
antiaircraft defenso (L2V0). But these formtions exist mostly
on paper, are not supported from a material-technical standpoint,
are semi-voluntary organizations, and are not properly directed by
anyone. In addition, organs of the MPVO are concerned with a very
larce number of problems which, in essence, are the prerogatives of
governmental authority, such as commications, supplying the popu-
lation with food, evacuation, etc.
It appcars to us that such very important undertakings as medical
assistance to the suffering populace and rehabilitative work, i.e.,
meacures permitting the peoplA.to withstand .enear .nuclear attack, .
must be impler.ented by special troops. Their cadres and necessary
equipzent r:ust be maintained in peacetime and they must be assured
bobilizational buildup under the leadership of organs of military
control with the initiation of military sptivities.
Qutestions of Control. -Fromthe standpoint of the nature of
control of operationsy the new forms of armed conflict do not
introduce any basic changes. As in the past there will be need for
intelligence and collation of its information, an appraisal of the
=-'situation, a decision, and its transmittal to executors, supervision
of execution, influence on the course of events by changing the
tasks of subordinate troops, or through the influence of the senior -
commnder's means exerted on the enemy, the ixforming of the comander
- - and of adjacent units. However, -the methods of control and the means
'by which they are implemented experience significant changes.
. The method of direct personal contact in operations is of little
value today. It can lead only to a waste of the senior commander's
tim and promote incorrect decisions based upon impressions of one
center of combat operations. This method is admissible now only in
combat on a subunit level, but not in operations.
The need to see the field of combat along the decisive direction
also has little admissibility now. This need arose from crushing -
the enemy with masses of troops which were in direct contact .with.him.
This will not usually happen, now.
The most important thing in control is quick reaction to a change
in the situation, a rapid tempo of control, and, consequently, the
well-known need for -its mechanization, autcoation, and reduction of
-- .3(a,(4)
I.a)(4)
" iC