III-018 “The Theory of Military Art Needs Review,” by Col. Gen. A.I. Gastilovich and Lt. Gen. I.A. Tolkonyuk, special collection of Military Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 1960, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 18 December 1961,

for the enemy and as long as ground antiaircraft missile systems do
not possess a sufficient range of destruction.
In addition, the front needs a unnifold troop (army) aviation
for observation and reconnaissance, including radiation, for liaison, .
cc-nd, and transport. Such aviation must undoubted~y develop as
non airfield-based. It my consist of helicopters and other flyinS
machinos, for eample the type well known in foreign literature under
.the term "flying saucers" (ground effect mchine-turbolet).
The WS of the front must have a mch greater number of
reconnaissance aircraft than they have at present.
Finally, greater-capacity-transport aviation is needed as a
resource of the Supreme High Conmand.
The WS of the front (air army) is not designated under modern . -
conditions for the execution of any independent air operations, and
is tho means for directly coordinated action with combined-arms
arnies. For this reason, their cceposition must include several
- aircraft divisions of ficater-bombers because only the latter are
favorable for combat against mobile carriers of nuclear weapons and.
the advancing reserves of the encmy. In this connection, however,
it is inadvioable to distribute the WS forces of the front for
support of definite armies or divisions; it is better to utilize
them centrally, under the djurisdiction of the VS commander.
The ravy. The future at see belongs to subnarines and to
missilo-carrying seaplanes irhich are not bound to airfields and wich
are capable of long-range operations. These, it would appear, should
now be developed.
The basic mission of the fleet -- to annihilate carriers of
nuclear/nissile weapons at sea which as a consequence of their
mobility, have greater survival chances. Such carriers will be
missile-carrying aircraft and missile-carrying atcmio subuarines.
As a result of their high radar-inge contrast and, cnsequently,
their vulnerability aircraft carriers and other surface .vessels
apparently will soon depart from the scene.
Under contemporary conditions it is hardly possible to ngine
large amphibious landing operations of an operationaland even less, .
of strategic significance. A landing force is always, at sos .stage
of its activity, a cospaot group or it does not uake sansei but this
1.3(afl)(
.~~~~ .3(IaX4)I.
-18-