Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency memorandum of 18 December 1961, sent to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, encloses a verbatim translation of a Soviet article from the top secret 1960 first issue of the special collection of Military Thought. In the article, Colonel-General A. Gastilovich argues that nuclear missiles call for revising Soviet military doctrine. He favors short blitz operations, smaller ground forces and new rescue troops. It mentions "flying saucers" only as ground effect machines for army aviation.
In connection with this it is necessary, evidently, to re- exanine our views on the nature of so-called coutarpreparation - (kontrpodgotovka) in defense and on organization of counterstrikes. In these questions e continue to proceed from the concept of the _,., solid and realatively stable front. It appears to u that a limited quantity of nuclear weapons in the defense ill not permit a breakup ot the enemy offenive with one or two rassive nuclear strikes, especially since heeoill not tormcompact groupings for his offensive. Apparently, instead of " counterprepnration, it will be necessary to restrict oneself to daily.3 and rapid annihiintion of disclosed enemy means of nuclear ' attack and to individual (to the extent possible) nuclear' strikes at various eimas on the most dangerous of his tank divisions which lshave broken through. I, rowever, -the availabilityof nuclear - . weapons permits the delivery of a eassine strike capable of breaking up the enemy offensive completely, then this is already not counter- preparation but going over t the offenseie. - atis more expedient to carry out counterstrikes in operational odefense , by means o meeting engagement , not with a compact grouping especially created for this purpose ans deployed on a definite line, but with several divisions operatingbimultaneously, though eros different directions. o i e a i . Anti-debarkation defense along the coast by ground troops can- - alo have no defensive zones either on the coast or in the zne of . interior.. In ports and in vulnerable landing sectors alonig the coast there can be separate tank subunits and units designdated basically -" for combat against airbo~ene landings and for initial repulsion of debarkations of the enemy in landing-daerka~tion craft. navy e basis of anti-dbartion defense mo t be the maneuvering . activities of large units which move up from the interior of coastal -" zones and, in meeting .engagements, pound the enemy utilizing nuclear weapons.- Of the now generally~ accepted means of anti-debarkastion defense,- only the construction of obstacles, both in the water.as..well as .on ,the land, can achieve much significance.- ! 'nengi amphibious landing operations, while enroute at ass, do ' ~ not merit expensive sand cumbersom~e operations against them by the navy and leigiange -aviation. The basis of their arm h intion can . * 1.3(a)(4 . .
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 23 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.